Let's leave hysteria to the monarchists by Pyke, John
  
 
   COVER SHEET 
 
 
Pyke, John R (1999) Let's Leave Hysteria to the Monarchists, in Uhr, 
John,  (Ed.)  The Australian Republic: The Case for Yes, Ch. 11,
pp. 78-89. Federation Press.
 
 
 
Accessed from  http://eprints.qut.edu.au
 
 
Copyright 1999 John R. Pyke  
 11 
Let’s leave hysteria to the 
monarchists 
John Pyke 
Lecturer in Law at Queensland University of Technology, and a 
leading consultant on constitutional issues to Queensland’s 
Electoral and Administrative Review Commission 
It has become clear that the worst enemies of the Australian 
republic are – republican Australians! So many republicans, 
having formed a preference for some particular model of the 
republic, have then become convinced that their model is the 
only acceptable model and spend much of their time 
spreading hysteria about the disaster that would befall us if 
another model were adopted.  
 When I say this I am not just referring to direct-
election republicans – the Cleary-Mack-Jones team – 
campaigning for a ‘no’ vote. I am also referring to the many 
earnest advocates of the bipartisan parliamentary election 
model who keep insisting that we couldn’t possibly leave the 
election of the President to the people. Every time they say 
this they reinforce the suspicion in the minds of direct-
election supporters that parliamentary-election people in 
general, and the Australian Republican Movement (ARM) in 
particular, are a thoroughly undemocratic, or demophobic, 
lot (as indeed some of them are!), and make it less likely that 
the direct-election people will vote ‘yes’. 
 This passionate commitment to one and only one 
model of the republic would be all very well if there were 
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only two ‘sides’ contesting the referendum campaign and one 
side was logically certain to attract a majority vote – but 
something like 30 percent of the Australian people still want 
to retain the House of Windsor as our nominal sovereign, 
and they will vote ‘no’ to whatever republic is proposed. As 
long as the republicans are divided, the monarchists hold a 
veto. Propose the so-called ‘ConCon’ model – it will lose if all 
direct-election republicans vote ‘no’. Then propose the 
(apparently more popular) direct-election model – it will also 
lose, if all supporters of ARM take the ‘my model or nothing’ 
approach that they criticise so vigorously in the direct-
election republicans. We will retain the monarchy forever, or 
at least as long as monarchists have enough votes to play a 
spoiling role (which is to say, until one kind of republic 
attracts 50 percent of people’s first preferences).  
 So this chapter is addressed to both sides of the 
republican schism. Republicans should forget their hysteria 
about each other’s models. Let’s leave the hysteria to the 
monarchists, and all accept that either of the main models 
for an Australian republic should work acceptably well. 
Direct-election republicans should vote ‘yes’ in November, 
and hope for a better republic later. Parliamentary-election 
republicans should treat direct-election republicans as 
potential allies, not as deranged fools, and try to win a 
‘second-preference yes’ from them. They should also, in the 
horrible eventuality that the 1999 referendum is defeated, be 
prepared to vote ‘yes’ at a later referendum – even if next 
time the Government only offers the people a republic where 
they vote directly for the President. 
 Why do I say the arguments about each type of 
republic are hysterical? First, let’s consider republics from 
around the world. Malcolm Turnbull lists 15 republics with 
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non-executive Presidents.1 Their methods of electing 
Presidents are tabulated below: 
 
 
Direct election 
 
– usually with a 
requirement for 
nomination by a 
high number of 
voters, or for 
nomination or 
screening by 
Parliament 
 
Elected by 
Parliament 
Elected by an 
electoral college 
– usually 
members of 
central 
Parliament and 
regional/state 
assemblies 
Austria 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Greece 
Israel 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Trinidad and   
      Tobago* 
Bangladesh 
Germany 
Italy 
Vanuatu 
India 
* described as electoral college, but this consists of  
all members of  both Houses of Parliament 
 
 The table shows that republics of all kinds can func-
tion equally well. Around the world you can find republics 
with directly elected presidents, that are stable democracies 
that respect the rule of law, and republics with presidents 
elected by parliament or an electoral college that are stable 
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democracies that respect the rule of law. If two or three of 
the republics in the table are less than perfect democracies, 
that is because of special factors such as lack of a democratic 
tradition, or racial and religious intolerance far more 
entrenched than any similar problems here. It would be 
insulting to Greece, Germany, Israel and Italy to say that 
they are not democratic because they do not elect their 
Presidents directly. It would be insulting to Austria, Iceland, 
Ireland or Portugal to say that they are unstable because 
they do elect their Presidents directly, and ludicrous to say it 
of Singapore where the criticism might instead be that it is 
all too stable. 
 Of course it is true that every one of these republics 
has different detailed provisions in its Constitution, partic-
ularly as to the powers of the President, and ours will 
presumably be different from any of them. So for example 
parliamentary-election advocates warn us that we may not 
be as stable as Ireland if we opt for direct election, because 
the Irish Constitution gives very limited power to the 
President whereas ours will (if minimally amended as 
generally assumed) give the President ‘dangerous’ powers. 
But that is to assume the correctness of one of the hysterical 
forecasts about the future under the ‘wrong’ version of the 
republic, which are addressed below.  
 Let us turn to the specific suggestions about how the 
world will fall apart if we go for the wrong model. When you 
consider them rationally, they are so hysterical that I 
wonder whether most of them have been cooked up in some 
monarchist kitchen and poured into the ears of republicans 
while they slept! (See Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 5.) In the 
following table I present each hysterical argument with its 
rational rebuttal. 
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Argument Direct-election advocates are hopelessly divided. 
There is no agreed model. 
Rebuttal The ‘ConCon’ model only emerged out of last-
minute negotiations. If another convention 
contained a majority of direct-election people, 
they would negotiate an agreement too. In 
everything that follows I will assume that the 
majority would prefer a non-executive President. 
Supporters of an executive President à la the 
United States seem to be a definite minority.  
 
Argument The people will elect a pop star or a footballer. 
Rebuttal Hysterical nonsense! Consider the last 
Presidential election in Ireland. A pop singer did 
indeed get nominated – but she only got 
9 percent of the vote, and the majority of the 
people elected a law professor as their President. 
Should we expect the people of Australia to be 
more superficial than the people of Ireland? 
 
Argument The election will cost too much. 
Rebuttal All elections are expensive but that’s a small 
price for democracy. If we took this argument 
seriously, we wouldn’t have elections but invite 
the Chief of General Staff, or the Chief 
Executive Officer of BHP, to rule by decree! And 
besides, election by Parliament will not be 
particularly cheap either, if Parliament has to be 
recalled especially for the ‘election’ of a 
President. 
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Argument A directly-elected President will feel that they 
have as much legitimacy as the Prime Minister, 
and will be tempted to try to take over real 
executive power. 
Rebuttal (i) If this means that the President will try to 
rule like the President of the United States, 
there are many other provisions in the 
Constitution and in our general public law that 
will stop them from doing so.  
  (ii) If it means that a directly-elected President 
will be more likely to do the wrong thing in a 
‘1975-revisited’ scenario, there is absolutely no 
guarantee that a President elected by 
Parliament won’t have secret ambitions, like 
Kerr, to exercise real power and to make a mark 
on history. As long as conflicts over ‘supply’ can 
arise between the Houses of Parliament, the 
danger is there under our current Constitution, 
and the same danger will remain under either 
model of republic. 
 
Argument Candidates will only be able to campaign if they 
are supported by a political party. It will 
therefore be more likely, not less, that we will 
get a politician as President this way than if we 
leave it to the politicians. 
Rebuttal Some truth in this one. Consider Ireland again: 
the last-but-one President, Mary Robinson, was 
supported by the Labour Party and had Fine 
Gael’s preference recommendation, and the 
current President, Mary McIlhenny, was 
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supported by Fianna Fail. But in each case the 
winner seems to have had support across party 
lines, and nobody has suggested that either has 
shown any partisanship in the carrying out of 
her duties. Perhaps the real fear here is that 
candidates will send subtle messages that they 
will be prepared to show bias towards a certain 
party in a crisis, and that people will vote for 
them because of that. I think most Australians 
will understand that they need to select someone 
who will be neutral and fair.  
Arguments against election by Parliament 
Argument Members of Parliament are politicians, and 
they’ll elect a politician. 
Rebuttal First, this seems to be based on total ignorance 
of the details of the proposal. With a 
requirement for nomination by the Prime 
Minister and seconding by the leader of the 
Opposition, and then election by a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority, only someone who is 
trusted by both sides of politics will stand a 
chance of being elected. A politician might be 
elected, but they would have to be a politician 
with an extraordinary reputation for being 
balanced and fair-minded. 
   Secondly, what is so terrible about a former 
politician becoming President? Governor-
Generals McKell, Casey and Hasluck had all 
been politicians, and were all greatly respected 
as Governor-General. Labor Party supporters 
may have been disappointed by Bill Hayden’s 
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conversion to monarchism, but nobody has 
suggested that he made any decisions that 
showed a bias towards his former party. 
 
Argument Election by Parliament is less democratic than 
direct election by the people. 
Rebuttal For democratic government, it is not necessary 
that all officials be directly elected. We don’t 
elect judges, we don’t directly elect the Prime 
Minister. Unlike some US states, we don’t elect 
dog-catchers and state prosecutors. The 
President needs to be someone who will be 
respected by both sides of politics, and who will 
apply the same rules to both sides in the 
political struggle. They should therefore be 
elected by more than a mere majority vote – and 
it’s only possible to demand this of a relatively 
small group of voters. 
More hysteria: the ‘last chance  
for decades’ theories 
In the last few months, we have heard more and more the of 
the two ‘last chance’ arguments. Parliamentary-election 
supporters are claiming that if the 1999 referendum is lost 
we won’t have another chance to vote for a republic for 
several decades. Direct-election supporters are saying we’d 
better not vote ‘yes’ to the current proposal because if it is 
passed no government will ever offer us the chance to change 
from parliamentary election to direct election. The good old 
Aussie technique, the scare campaign, lives! As an aside, I 
wonder whether monarchists are whispering it into the ears 
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of both kinds of republicans – thinking up scare tactics to 
oppose change comes naturally to conservatives, and it 
would be such fun for them to dream up scare stories and 
feed them to those who have generally been their opponents 
in the past! Again I present the arguments and the rebuttals 
in a table. 
 
Argument If we vote ‘no’ we won’t get another chance to 
vote for a republic for ‘several decades’ (letter 
from Michael Lavarch to former ARM members, 
dated 22 March 1999). 
Rebuttal I think everyone should vote ‘yes’, but I hate 
dishonest arguments – and this is totally 
dishonest. A republic is inevitable, in a country 
with Australia’s anti-aristocratic spirit. If 
postponed for a while, it will simply become 
more inevitable. I don’t want to seem too callous, 
but the most vocal monarchists are dying off one 
by one, and as every batch of 17-year-olds turns 
18 the British monarchy will have fewer 
supporters – and it will have even fewer when 
Charles Windsor succeeds to the throne. Within 
a few years we’ll have a republican Prime 
Minister (Beazley, Crean, Costello or Reith). Of 
course if all republicans just fall into a sulk 
there will be no further referendum, but we 
won’t – will we? If we keep up the pressure 
there’ll be another referendum within 3 to 5 
years – and if we’re defeated in 1999 maybe we’ll 
learn from experience and agree to support 
whatever form of republic is put forward, and 
argue afterwards whether further change is 
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needed. Indeed, we should agree to do that now 
– but not because of silly arguments about the 
last chance for decades. 
   
Argument If we vote ‘yes’ we won’t get a chance to vote for 
a real republic for decades, if ever. 
Rebuttal There will be a lot of pressure on the 
Government of the new republic to call another 
convention to consider further change because: 
  (i) The Constitutional Convention recommended 
that, if a republic is adopted, there should be 
another convention in 5 years, this time with 
two-thirds of the members elected. This has no 
legal force but it will have strong moral force, 
especially considering: 
  (ii) The adoption of a republic in itself will be a 
symbolic affirmation that We the People are the 
sovereign authority in this country. Hopefully, 
the Constitution itself will say much more 
clearly than at present that we own our 
Constitution (though this seems doubtful now 
that the Howard draft preamble has been 
released – see Appendix). If there is any call 
from a substantial number of people for further 
change, the politicians should find it hard to 
ignore.  
  And if we do have a ‘further change’ referendum 
the ARM won’t be there to organise a ‘no’ 
campaign because they dissolve once we get a 
republic! 
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Conclusions and consequences 
First, for the Government  
We the People really should be allowed to choose on a 
preferential-voting basis between the present system and 
either form of republic. The world wouldn’t end if you gave 
Us the People a real choice! And to the various constitutional 
lawyers who say you can’t present alternative amendments 
in a constitutional referendum, I say – what an unimag-
inative lot you are! Section 128 of the Constitution requires 
that a majority of people (nationwide and in a majority of the 
states) must approve a proposed law altering the Consti-
tution. It does not take much creativity to design a ballot 
paper in which people can indicate whether they approve one 
or both or neither of two proposed alterations – and if both, 
which one they approve the most. If one received approval 
which satisfied section 128, it could be presented for the 
‘royal’ assent. If both satisfied section 128, one would hope 
that the one with the greatest support would be presented 
for assent – though we might have to trust to the 
Government’s good faith on that! 
Second, for direct-election republicans 
If the Government is only going to give us one republican 
choice, and that is going to be the bipartisan model, it should 
be supported for the following reasons: first, it’s really not all 
that terrible; and second, only by voting in some sort of republic 
can we shut the monarchists out of the debate, and rob them of 
their balance of power. While there is a debate between three 
alternatives, and while enough republicans insist ‘my model or 
nothing’, the monarchists will win – whichever model is 
offered. But once a majority has voted for some sort of republic, 
the continuation of monarchy is dead as an alternative. It will 
LET’S LEAVE HYSTERIA TO THE MONARCHISTS 
 
89
never come back. Future constitutional debate can only be 
about whether to make further amendments to the form of the 
republic – and monarchists will either have to abstain or 
choose which kind of republic they hate the least. (But don’t be 
over-confident that, in a later ‘face-off’ between the two 
republican models, yours will win). Once we have a republic, 
some monarchists will want a ‘real’ republic; others will want 
to stick to the minimal change. Don’t get hysterical over the 
prospect of no further change – the minimal republic, I repeat, 
is really not all that terrible. 
Finally, for parliamentary-election republicans 
Do not campaign for a ‘yes’ vote by slagging the idea of direct 
election, and attacking its supporters as simpletons. This is a 
marvellous way of getting their backs up and ensuring they 
will vote ‘no’, even if just to punish the elitist, anti-
democratic lot pushing parliamentary election due to their 
hysteria about direct election. Instead, try to persuade them 
by saying:  
You want a different kind of republic, and no doubt it 
would work, just as ours would work. But ‘bipartisan 
election’ is all the Prime Minister is going to offer. It 
will be way better than hereditary monarchy, so please 
vote ‘yes’. And then, if you don’t like the way the 
republic works, feel free to campaign for further 
change. That will be the time for us to fight each other.  
 And then don’t get hysterical over the prospect that 
there might be a further referendum one day, and that direct 
election might win. It’s really not all that terrible either. 
Note 
1  Malcolm Turnbull, The Reluctant Republic, Heinemann, 1993, 
Appendix Three.  
